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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4425
___________
DAVID WILLIAMSON,
Appellant
vs.
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.; CHRISTINE MALANEY,
DONNA PLANTE; MARGARET LOVE; CHUKS IHUOMA; DR. SITTA C.
ALIE, also known as Dr. Sitta C. Gombeh-Alie; DR. ALAN
ZIMBLE; MICHELLE ROBINSON; JUANITA CLARK; DR. CARLA KIONKE;
FIRST CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL, INC.; FIRST CORRECTIONAL
MEDICAL-DELAWARE LLC
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-00379)
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 17, 1008
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES AND WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 23, 2008)
___________
OPINION
___________
2PER CURIAM.
In June 2006, David Williamson filed a complaint alleging that appellees
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.  By order entered July 19,
2007, the District Court granted Appellee First Correctional Medical, Inc.’s (FCMI)
motion to dismiss and denied Williamson’s motion for a default judgment against FCMI. 
By order entered September 11, 2007, the District Court denied Williamson’s request for
a preliminary injunction and, by order entered October 23, 2007, it denied his motion for
reconsideration.  Williamson filed a notice of appeal from those orders.  The case is
proceeding in the District Court as to Williamson’s claims against the remaining
defendants.
We lack jurisdiction over the order denying Williamson’s motions for
default and the order granting FCMI’s motion to dismiss.  The orders appealed must end
the litigation as to all claims and all parties.  Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334
(1963).  Rule 54(b) provides that a District Court may direct entry of final judgment as to
fewer than all claims and parties if the District Court “expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay.”  Here, the District Court did not certify the order under Rule
54(b).  Because those orders do not dismiss all claims as to all parties and are not certified
by the District Court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the orders are not appealable at this
time.
3We do have jurisdiction over the appeal of the order denying Williamson’s
request for injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  The details of Williamson’s
claims are well known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s memorandum order,
and need not be discussed at length.  Briefly, Williamson asked that appellee CMS be
ordered to provide him medication for his thyroid condition, reconstructive knee surgery,
physical therapy, and dental treatment.  In deciding whether to issue a preliminary
injunction, the District Court must consider “(1) whether the movant has a reasonable
probability of success on the merits; (2) whether irreparable harm would result if the
relief sought is not granted; (3) whether the relief would result in greater harm to the
non-moving party, and (4) whether the relief is in the public interest.”  Swartzwelder v.
McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2002).  We review the denial of a motion for a
preliminary injunction to determine whether the District Court abused its discretion,
committed an obvious error in applying the law, or made a serious mistake in considering
the proof.  In re Assets of Myles Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1357 (3d Cir. 1993).  
In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for denial of medical
care, Williamson must show that the appellees were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  Deliberate indifference can
be shown by a prison official “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”  Id. at 104.  A medical need
is serious if it is one “that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one
4that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.”  Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347
(3d Cir. 1987).
In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Williamson asserted that on
February 24, 2006, he was given a temporary composite repair for a broken tooth instead
of a crown.  He argued that the repair was substandard and will fail sometime during his
incarceration.  He did not contend that he was suffering from any pain caused by the tooth
at that time.  He requested that CMS be ordered to provide him with a crown and a root
canal.  Appellees submitted an affidavit from a dentist stating that Williamson had
received a permanent composite restoration to his tooth and root canal was deemed
unnecessary.  As to Williamson’s requests for treatment for his knee, the District Court
noted that he underwent knee surgery in March 2007 and received physical therapy.  The
District Court denied Williamson’s requests for surgery and therapy as moot.  Williamson
admits that this issue is now moot.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Williamson injunctive relief with respect to the repair of his tooth or his knee
surgery. 
Williamson alleged that he requires thyroid medication daily.  He asserted
that he is prescribed a thirty day supply with three refills and is given a card with thirty
days of medication to keep in his cell.  However, he alleged that he often does not get the
next thirty-day card until days after he has run out of medication.  Appellees argued that
5CMS had undertaken systemwide policy changes in the delivery of medications.  The
District Court recognized that Williamson had not received his medication on a timely
basis in the past but concluded that Williamson was then receiving his medication in a
timely manner.  The District Court noted that the appellees submitted an affidavit from a
doctor who opined that lapses in thyroid medication would not amount to a serious
medical need.  The District Court determined that injunctive relief was not necessary and
Williamson would not suffer irreparable harm.  We agree and conclude that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying injunctive relief with respect to the thyroid
medication.  Williamson has not shown a reasonable probability of demonstrating that
appellees were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
Williamson alleged that he does not receive the necessary care for his
periodontal disease.  The District Court summarized the care Williamson had received
and determined that Williamson had not shown that appellees were deliberately
indifferent to his serious dental needs.  We agree.  With respect to his periodontal disease,
Williamson has not shown that the District Court abused its discretion in denying
injunctive relief.  Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Williamson’s
motion for reconsideration.
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s October 23, 2007,
judgment.  Appellees’ motion to strike appellant’s opening brief is denied.  Appellees’
motion to strike Appellant’s response to Appellees’ answering brief is denied.  Appellee
Zimble’s motions to file a supplemental appendix and to seal that appendix are granted. 
Williamson’s motion to strike appellee Zimble’s brief is denied.  Appellees’ motion for
leave to file a supplemental appendix is granted.  Appellees’ motion to seal the
supplemental appendix is granted.  Williamson’s motion for leave to file an addendum to
his response to Appellees’ brief is granted. 
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